The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) operates the largest and most diverse transportation system in the nation, and keeping it secure entails significant challenges. Each weekday, the MTA provides 8 million subway, commuter rail, and bus trips in a 5,000-square-mile area that extends from New York City through Long Island, southeastern New York State, and Connecticut.

The MTA operates a total of 734 subway and commuter rail stations—many of which operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The MTA also operates a network of bridges and tunnels that are a vital component of New York City’s transportation infrastructure. The strength of the mass transit system—its ability to move large numbers of people quickly through numerous entry points—also makes it difficult to secure.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the MTA initiated an intense planning effort to determine how to best protect its customers and key assets from a terrorist incident. These efforts culminated in a multifaceted strategy that included operational initiatives, such as increasing the size and presence of uniformed security personnel; and 57 security-related projects funded through the capital program to harden and control access to vulnerable facilities.

The MTA’s 2000-2004 capital program allocated $591 million to fund the 24 highest-priority security projects (i.e., Phase 1). MTA officials informed us that the 24 projects planned for Phase 1 were reconfigured into 17 construction projects for contracting purposes. The 2005-2009 capital program includes another $495 million to fund the remaining 33 projects (i.e., Phase 2).

Events since September 11, 2001, have only heightened concerns about the risks posed by terrorists willing to carry out large-scale indiscriminate attacks on public transportation systems. In December 2003, Chechen rebels bombed a Russian commuter train, resulting in 46 fatalities and 165 injuries. In March 2004, terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured 600. The London rail and bus bombings in July 2005 resulted in more than 50 fatalities and more than 700 injuries.

In the wake of the London bombings, the MTA was subject to increased scrutiny and criticism of the progress of its security program. In response to press accounts that security-related capital projects had fallen behind schedule, the State Comptroller initiated a review of the program. During the course of the inquiry, the Office of the State Comptroller reported in September 2005 that the estimated cost of Phase 1 had grown by 22 percent, from $591 million to $721 million.

In response to these developments, the State Comptroller announced the formation of an internal task force to review the MTA security program. This report, which is expected to be the first in a series of reviews and audits that will concentrate on the MTA security program, focuses on the progress of planned capital projects.
Scope and Methodology

The findings in this report were developed with the cooperation of the MTA, and are based on a review of MTA documents and interviews with MTA and other officials. The MTA documents include construction schedules and budget information by asset class (e.g., bridge or station) and by type of mitigation (e.g., hardening or electronic surveillance). All of the information provided to us by the MTA met MTA security protocols regarding the dissemination of confidential security information.

The State Comptroller believes the public has a right to know how well the MTA is progressing with the implementation of planned capital security projects, but that need must be balanced against the release of information that could compromise security. For this reason, this report does not discuss the status of individual security projects or the status of a particular asset class or mitigation. Instead, it focuses on the overall progress of the capital security program.

Moreover, nothing in this report should be interpreted as an endorsement of the MTA’s strategies or its prioritization of projects. Such decisions are made exclusively by the MTA, which has relied heavily on the recommendations of outside consultants to make those decisions.

Finally, while this report focuses on the progress of the MTA capital security program, it also describes a number of operational initiatives implemented by the MTA to enhance security, and discusses the role of the federal government in transit security.

Findings

The federal government has not allocated sufficient resources nor has it provided adequate guidance to secure the nation’s mass transportation systems. For example, in federal fiscal year 2005 the federal government allocated $5 billion to aviation security but only $130 million to mass transit security, even though passenger rail systems carry 16 times more passengers daily than commercial airlines. According to the Government Accountability Office, most of the Transportation Security Administration’s research and development efforts have focused on aviation security technologies, leaving passenger rail operators to develop their own solutions and evaluate existing and emerging technologies on their own.

Phase 1 of the MTA’s capital security program included 17 separate construction projects, but one project was abandoned by the MTA after extensive review and a technical assessment. Each of the remaining 16 projects includes one or more facilities and mitigations. For example, a bridge project could include multiple bridges and various types of security improvements.

The projects that comprise Phase 1 target the MTA’s most vulnerable and heavily used assets, such as stations and transit hubs, bridges, and tunnels. Mitigation efforts include perimeter protection, structural hardening, improved fire/life safety and evacuation, and electronic security and surveillance.

We found that while Phase 1 of the MTA’s capital security program got off to a fast start, it quickly fell behind schedule and that the delays are systemic and not just limited to electronic security projects as previously reported by the media. For example, Phase 1 will not be completed until November 2009, which is 14 months later than originally planned. According to MTA officials, the security program has fallen behind schedule mostly because the projects were more complicated than initially thought and many

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1 The Transportation Security Administration is under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security.

2 Six planned mitigation tasks were not pursued for various reasons.
of the projects were unprecedented in the construction field.

We also found that Phase 2 of the capital security program has not even begun. (Phase 2 is designed to complete the other 33 projects on the original list of 57 high-priority projects.) We were informed that Phase 2 is under review pending the completion of an assessment by an outside consultant and the receipt of federal funding.

Though the capital security program is significantly behind schedule and over budget, the transit system is more secure today than it was before September 11, 2001. The MTA has implemented, with the cooperation of other stakeholders, a number of operational initiatives that have mitigated—to some degree—inherent security risks. In addition, one capital security project has been completed and the MTA’s two highest-priority projects are scheduled to be completed by August 2006.

Below is the status, as of December 27, 2005, of the 16 construction projects that comprise Phase 1 of the capital security program.

- Of the 16 projects under review, one is five months ahead of schedule and another four are within three months of schedule.
- Half of the projects are eight or more months behind schedule, including five that are 20 months or more behind schedule.
- Five projects were expected to be completed by March 1, 2006, but only one has been completed.
- Ten projects are still in the design stage and only five are in the construction phase.
- Phase 1 is $130 million over budget, and the cost may grow as projects move through the construction phase.
- The electronic security program, as currently funded, is expected to cost more than $400 million and accounts for more than half of the expected cost of Phase 1.

- The MTA announced in July 2005 that it planned to accelerate the program and commit all of the available resources for Phase 1 by December 31, 2005. The MTA, however, committed $428 million, a shortfall of 27 percent. Moreover, this represents only 59 percent of the current expected cost of Phase 1 ($721 million).

**Project Timeline**

In April 2002, only seven months after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the MTA completed five risk assessments with the help of outside consultants (see Figure 1). The assessments identified 57 high-priority capital projects—with an estimated cost of $1 billion—that would address the most serious vulnerabilities of the mass transit system.

The first risk assessment, conducted by the security firm Kroll Government Services Inc., (Kroll) was a systemic vulnerability assessment of the MTA’s operations. The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also funded risk assessments, conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., of Metro-North Railroad, Long Island Rail Road, and New York City Transit. In addition, ManTech International Corp., a defense contractor, was retained by New York City Transit.

Also in April 2002, the MTA entered into discussions with the United States Army to manage implementation of the entire security program. One month later, the MTA submitted its list of 57 projects to the New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) to be included as part of a statewide application for grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Hazard Mitigation Aid program.
MTA begins discussions with the Army
MTA establishes the position of Security Director and hires Louis Anemone

MTA initiates risk assessments

MTA completes risk assessments, identifying 57 priority capital projects with a total cost of $1 billion

MTA submits projects to SEMO

SEMO submits projects to FEMA, including $142.6 million in funding for top 6 MTA projects

FEMA approves State’s funding proposal

MTA begins preparation of Master Contract with the Army; the Army to serve as Program Manager

MTA hires William Moranges as Security Director; Anemone is relieved of his position

MTA Capital Review Board approves MTA’s amended capital plan, which includes $591 million for the first 24 months and additional capital items.

MTA completes draft Master Contract with the Army

MTA issues RFP for engineering consultant for the security program

MTA awards contracts to 4 engineering consultants

Figure 1

Source: Interviews with State officials and OSDC analysis of federal and State documents.
The MTA projects competed with hundreds of others from public and private agencies for just $418 million in FEMA grants. In January 2003—eight months after receiving the MTA’s proposal and after receiving two time extensions from FEMA—SEMO submitted its application to FEMA. In February 2003, FEMA approved SEMO’s application, and $142.6 million in FEMA grants was allocated to the MTA’s six highest-priority projects.

In July 2003, the MTA Capital Program Review Board\(^3\) approved an amendment to the 2000-2004 capital program, thus allocating $591 million to fund the first 24 security projects (i.e., Phase 1) of the 57 capital construction projects identified by the MTA.

According to interviews with MTA officials, in October 2003—after 14 months of discussions with the U.S. Army that culminated in the MTA Board’s approval of a proposed contract—negotiations with the Army were terminated when it became clear that certain technical issues, such as liability insurance and control over implementing projects on MTA properties, were obstacles the MTA and the Army could not overcome.

According to MTA officials, much of the 14 months was spent performing conceptual design work and other tasks that needed to be completed regardless of who oversaw the program, and only four months were lost by negotiating with the U.S. Army.

In October 2003 the MTA Capital Construction Company (established in August 2003) took over management of the capital security program, which had previously been managed by the individual agencies. In March 2004—five months after negotiations with the Army were concluded—the MTA entered into contracts with engineering consultants to begin design work on the six FEMA-funded projects. The MTA had negotiated a September 2003 start date with FEMA, but the projects did not begin until seven months later, in May 2004.

The Federal Role

Passenger rail systems in the United States carry 16 times more passengers daily than commercial airlines. Despite the high passenger volume, the federal government has spent much more money on aviation security than on mass transit security. In federal fiscal years 2003 and 2004, $8.9 billion in federal funds was spent on aviation security, while only $115 million was allocated to transit security. The 9/11 Commission has characterized the federal government’s emphasis on aviation security as “fight[ing] the last war,” and stated that “opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation” as in aviation.\(^4\)

Nevertheless, this funding trend continued in FFY 2005, when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) allocated $130 million to mass transit security and $5 billion to aviation security. Moreover, the New York metropolitan area, which accounts for 58 percent of all rail passenger trips in the nation, received only 35 percent of the funding allocated to rail transit.\(^5\) In FFY 2006, the Homeland Security budget appropriation included $5.8 billion for aviation security and a total of only $150 million for railroads, subways, buses, and other surface transportation systems, including freight rail.

In July 2005, the MTA and other transit operators testified before Congress that they were often unsure of where to turn when seeking information on security-related

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3 The Capital Program Review Board includes representatives of the Governor, the Speaker of the State Assembly, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Mayor of the City of New York.


5 Ibid., 8-9.
products, such as intrusion detection systems.\(^6\) Most of the DHS’s research and development efforts on transportation have focused on aviation security technologies, leaving passenger rail operators to develop solutions and evaluate existing and emerging technologies on their own.

A September 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended that the DHS, in collaboration with the Department of Transportation and the transit industry, evaluate the feasibility of establishing and maintaining an information clearinghouse on passenger rail security technologies and best practices used both in the United States and abroad.\(^7\)

The MTA currently participates in the DHS BioWatch Program, which provides sensors at Pennsylvania Station and Grand Central Terminal to test for the presence of biological agents in the air. As part of this program, the MTA works with the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and Department of Health and Hygiene. In addition, the MTA informed us that it has worked with Argonne National Labs, the DHS, and local agency first responders to deploy a chemical detection system in a major terminal that detects selected gases and nerve agents.

The MTA also participated in a successful pilot project headed by the Transportation Security Administration that led to the implementation of an explosive detection program that utilizes portable electronic scanning equipment to assist the MTA police when conducting random bag searches.

**Contract Process**

In December 2002, the MTA declared the existence of an emergency relating to security, and thus suspended competitive bidding for the capital security program. As a result, security-related contracts are not required to be advertised or formally bid, and can be awarded without MTA Board approval. While the suspension of formal competitive bidding may have merit due to the need for heightened security, it increases the opportunities for abuse.

The MTA contends that although contracts for the capital security program are not awarded pursuant to competitive bidding requirements, a competitive process has been developed. MTA officials have explained that this competitive process has been implemented among qualified firms. This may entail “informal competitive discussions” with qualified contractors, and in some cases the issuance of change orders to existing contracts. In addition, we were told that the Board Committee that oversees MTA Capital Construction receives bimonthly project status briefings, and that the MTA Board has approved construction awards.

**Adherence to Project Schedules**

Phase 1 was initially comprised of 24 projects, but the program was repackaged into 17 construction projects for contracting purposes. Each project includes one or more facilities and mitigations. For example, a bridge project could include multiple bridges and various types of security improvements. One project was abandoned for technical reasons, according to MTA officials.\(^8\) Thus, Phase 1, as presently planned, is comprised of 16 construction projects.

These projects target the MTA’s most vulnerable and heavily used assets, such as transit hubs, major bridges, and underwater tunnels. Mitigation efforts include hardening tunnels, reinforcing support structures, protecting perimeters, improving fire

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\(^8\) The MTA informed us that six other mitigations were not pursued because they were either not technically feasible or were too costly, and the vulnerability could be mitigated through other means.
prevention and evacuation systems, and installing electronic surveillance cameras and intrusion controls.

One way to assess a project’s progress is to determine how far the project has progressed against the MTA’s own expectations. We hoped to compare the current schedule for each of the 16 construction projects under review to the schedules that were prepared when the projects were first proposed. Those original schedules do not exist, however, because the MTA was uncertain when funding for the program would be approved.

Instead, we compared the current schedule for each of the 16 construction projects to the “baseline” schedules that were developed two years ago by the MTA, in late 2003 and early 2004. The MTA informed us that these baseline schedules were the earliest schedules that included both start and completion dates.

As shown in Figure 2, design work on 11 of the 16 construction projects began within three months of the scheduled start date, but three projects were delayed by one year or more.

After a project begins, lost time can be recovered or new delays can arise, and with that in mind we also examined the progress of each project toward its scheduled completion date. In only two instances did a project make up for lost time after it began, and only one project did not lose any more time. In every other instance, projects fell further behind schedule.

Of the 16 projects under review, one is five months ahead of its scheduled completion date and another four are within three months of schedule. Half of the projects, however, are eight or more months behind schedule, including five that are 20 months or more behind schedule.

A project must successfully complete a number of phases before being completed. The process generally begins with conceptual design work and ends when construction is completed.

Currently, only five projects are in the construction phase and another ten are still in the design phase (see Figure 3). Only one project has been completed, and that was because the mitigation was performed as part of an unrelated ongoing capital project. Even so, the project was completed ten months behind schedule.

Four additional projects were expected to be completed by March 1, 2006, but as of now none will be completed by that date. Two of these projects, which represent the MTA’s highest priorities, are expected to be completed by August 2006, about five months behind schedule.

According to MTA officials, the security program fell behind mostly because the proposed mitigations were more complicated than initially thought; many projects are unprecedented in terms of construction and/or transportation applications; second opinions were sought on some projects during the design phase and multiple stakeholders had to

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Figure 2
Adherence to Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months Behind Schedule</th>
<th>0 to 3</th>
<th>4 to 7</th>
<th>8 to 11</th>
<th>≥12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late Start</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behind Schedule</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority; OSDC analysis

Figure 3
Construction Projects by Phase

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Phase</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Phase</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority; OSDC analysis

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9 The current schedule is dated December 27, 2005.
10 One project is five months ahead of schedule.
agree to a proposed course of action, which were not factored into the original schedules; and emphasis has been placed on the top six priorities at the expense of lower priority projects.

As shown in Figure 4, the MTA had planned to complete three projects during 2005, but only one was completed. It had planned to complete a total of seven projects by the end of 2006, but only three are now expected to be finished by that time. If the MTA keeps to the current schedule, Phase 1 will be completed by November 2009, which is 14 months later than originally planned.

![Program Progress](image)

**Figure 4**

**Program Progress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual/Forecast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority; OSDC analysis

Compliance with Budget Targets

In July 2003, the Capital Program Review Board approved an amendment to the MTA’s 2000-2004 capital program that allocated $591 million to the security program.11 The amendment assumed that the entire amount would be committed by December 31, 2003. MTA officials have since told us that this date was in fact merely a placeholder.

Following the London subway bombings on July 7, 2005, the MTA revealed that it had committed only $54 million of the $591 million budgeted for security projects—and that most of the commitments were for design work. The MTA said that it planned to “accelerate” the design and construction of the security program, and that it would commit the balance of the security budget by December 31, 2005.

In response to these developments, the Office of the State Comptroller initiated a review of the MTA security program. In September 2005, the Office of the State Comptroller reported that the projected cost of the capital security program had grown from $591 million to $721 million, an increase of $130 million or 22 percent. In response to this latest development, the State Comptroller announced the formation of an internal task force under the direction of the State Deputy Comptroller for the City of New York to examine the MTA’s security program.

According to MTA officials, the original $591 million budget was based on project plans that were very conceptual, and additional design work was needed to further define the projects. In addition, these officials stated that many of the security projects were unprecedented in the construction field, and therefore accurate estimates were difficult to obtain before the design process was completed.

In August 2005, the MTA awarded a $212 million contract to Lockheed Martin Corp., for an integrated electronic surveillance system. Still, as of December 31, 2005, the MTA had committed just $428 million, which represents only 59 percent of the currently anticipated cost of the program.

As shown in Figure 5, the electronic security program, which is expected to cost $403 million and account for 56 percent of the total cost of the capital security program, is responsible for the growth in the overall estimated cost of the security program. Costs are higher than expected because the proposed mitigation is more costly than first envisioned and because the scope of the program has been expanded.

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11 The allocation includes $142.6 million in FEMA grants.
The MTA has allocated $100 million of the 2005 operating budget surplus to cover projected overspending in the capital security program, and to fund other security initiatives. Although the MTA has not indicated how much of the 2005 surplus will be devoted to capital construction security projects, it intends to allocate nearly $33 million to fund other security-related initiatives, such as installing emergency exit release devices on subway station service entrances to facilitate evacuation in the event of an emergency.

**Figure 5**

**Security Project Cost By Type of Remediation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remediation</th>
<th>Original Estimate</th>
<th>Current Estimate</th>
<th>Change (Inc)/Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Security</td>
<td>$265.0</td>
<td>$403.1</td>
<td>$138.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Hardening</td>
<td>221.0</td>
<td>196.8</td>
<td>(24.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire/Life/Safety</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perimeter Protection</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$591.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$721.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>$130.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Metropolitan Transportation Authority; OSDC analysis

Phase 2 of the capital security program, which is part of the 2005-2009 capital program, is expected to cost $495 million and to cover the remaining 33 projects on the original list of 57 security projects developed in April 2002. According to MTA officials, the program has not been advanced because federal funding is lacking and because the entire program is under review in light of the terrorist attacks on the London transit system. MTA officials estimate that the design work would cost between $50 million to $60 million.

MTA officials acknowledge that Phase 2 will cost more than originally planned unless steps are taken to either reduce the cost or scale back the scope of projects. The MTA brought in Kroll in November 2005 to review the proposed program and to suggest changes. According to the MTA, it is working with Kroll to determine if the terrorist threat has changed since September 11, 2001, and if so, how to adjust Phase 2 to reflect the new security priorities. These changes could include narrowing or changing project scopes or abandoning them entirely.

**Operational Initiatives**

While the capital security program is significantly behind schedule and over budget, the MTA has implemented, with the cooperation of other stakeholders, a number of operational initiatives that have mitigated, to some degree, inherent security risks. For example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) now stations police officers at the entrances to underwater subway tunnels, and the MTA has installed temporary barriers at certain facilities, such as Grand Central Terminal.

The following is a partial list of actions taken by the MTA to enhance security and is not meant to be a comprehensive list of security-related efforts.

**Coordination**

Within the MTA transit system, multiple public safety agencies are responsible for security.

- The MTA Police Department patrols transit hubs, commuter rail facilities, infrastructure facilities, and key access points.

- The NYPD Transit Division patrols the NYC Transit system, infrastructure facilities, and transit hubs. At times of heightened security, the NYPD increases its presence at high profile areas as part of Operation Atlas.

- New York State Troopers patrol LIRR and Metro-North trains and stations as well as transit hubs during security alerts.

- National Guardsmen are stationed at the transit hubs and are also deployed throughout the City subway system during heightened security alerts.
• Local law enforcement agencies (including the Connecticut State police) along the LIRR and Metro-North rights-of-way patrol local stations.
• Amtrak police are responsible for patrolling Amtrak’s portion of Penn Station.
• Federal agencies such as the DHS, FBI, and FTA share information and coordinate activities with all of these agencies.

To coordinate the agencies and oversee the MTA’s security activities, the MTA created the Office of Public Safety (OPS) in October 2001. The OPS is overseen by the Director of Security, and facilitates and implements the security policies and priorities set by the MTA Board. The OPS includes liaisons from all of the MTA entities as well as the FBI, NYPD, NYS Office of Public Safety, Connecticut State Police, and Nassau and Suffolk county police departments.

The MTA also created the Joint Infrastructure Task Force (JITF) to evaluate and address security issues related to the transit system’s infrastructure. In 2003, the JITF was folded into the Interagency Counterterrorism Task Force (ICTF).

The ICTF is responsible for supervising and coordinating emergency drills, training, and intelligence sharing. The ICTF also produces a daily intelligence briefing on transit-related threats and terrorist activities that is shared with and used by approximately 350 transit and security agencies worldwide.

In addition, the ICTF engages in outreach to local police and emergency service providers along the LIRR and Metro-North rights-of-way. Although all of the MTA-operated entities are members of the ICTF, New Jersey Transit and Amtrak are not, despite the fact that they share responsibility with the MTA for securing Penn Station; they do, however, receive the ICTF’s daily intelligence briefings.

The MTA is also working to create a communications system that is compatible with the New York Statewide Wireless Network (SWN). The new system will address coverage issues, promote interoperability, and establish a standardized system for the MTA Police Department.

Despite these efforts, coordination among the security agencies can be difficult to achieve. In October 2005, City officials and the FBI issued a heightened alert for transit riders and increased police presence throughout the subway system based on intelligence. The federal DHS labeled the threat to be of “doubtful credibility,” however, which caused some confusion among the riding public and exposed rifts between City and federal security agencies. As a result, the DHS designated a liaison for New York City.

In January 2006, the MTA hired a former director of the FBI to develop prevention policies and to coordinate emergency response plans. Also, the Mayor of the City of New York recently announced that he intends to propose legislation that would give the New York City Police Commissioner a permanent seat on the boards of the MTA and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to ensure a role in security planning and capital security projects.

Uniformed Presence

Multiple layers of security agencies work to protect the transit network, and are particularly prevalent in transit hubs such as Grand Central Terminal, Penn Station, and the Jamaica Terminal. Since September 11, 2001, the MTA has increased the number of uniformed personnel in its police department by 201, an increase of 42 percent (see Figure 6). The MTA Police Department (MTAPD) has assigned 75 officers to counterterrorism operations, including a ten-person Emergency Services Unit and a Canine
Unit with 35 bomb-sniffing dogs.\textsuperscript{12} It also hired 261 additional Bridge and Tunnel officers for security operations. In response to the London bombings, in which terrorists carried explosives into the transit system using oversized backpacks, the NYPD and MTAPD began conducting random searches of riders’ bags and packages in July 2005.

\textbf{Drills and Training}

The Department of Homeland Security states that well-designed and well-executed drills are the most effective means of testing policies, plans, and procedures; clarifying and training personnel on their roles and responsibilities; and improving the coordination and communication between agencies.\textsuperscript{13} The FTA suggests that transit agencies and public safety agencies conduct tabletop drills at least once every six months, and full-scale exercises, coordinated with regional emergency response providers, at least once a year.

New York City Transit coordinates four emergency drills annually—two for the Department of Subways, one for the Department of Buses, and one for the Staten Island Railway. Although the frequency of drills has not increased since September 11, 2001, MTA officials have stated that their size and scope have expanded. Bridges and Tunnels has conducted over 20 emergency preparedness drills and exercises since the attacks on the World Trade Center. Many of these exercises were full-scale drills that involved the MTAPD, the NYPD, the FDNY, and the City Office of Emergency Management.

The LIRR conducts four full-scale emergency preparedness drills and exercises annually, and Metro-North stages numerous drills and exercises with various agencies throughout New York and Connecticut. These drills cover communications, fire, rescue, extrication, hazardous materials, and first aid.

The Transportation Workers Union Local 100 (TWU), which represents nearly 34,000 New York City Transit personnel, has asserted that its members have not been included in past drills or exercises.

As the ultimate “first responders” in the event of an emergency, training transit personnel to operate in and respond to emergency situations is an essential part of transit security. Best practices dictate that all transit employees be trained in safety, security, and emergency procedures. Security training should focus on prevention, detection and diagnosis, and mitigation and recovery.

We were informed by the MTA that all 65,000 of its employees have received security awareness brochures and basic awareness training. For example, we were told that New York City Transit’s “New Millennium—Eyes and Ears” training program provides basic awareness education on security and terrorism. According to the MTA, this two-hour program, which includes a 20-minute video sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration, has been delivered to all NYC Transit employees. In addition, a 45-minute refresher course is available through NYC Transit’s intranet.

\textsuperscript{12} The MTAPD has a goal to expand the number of bomb detection dogs to 50 by 2007.

The TWU, however, has criticized the MTA for not providing its frontline employees with more training. The TWU organized a training program with the International Union of Operating Engineers and the West Virginia National Guard for union members, and hired an Israeli security consultant to train some of its members in terrorist deterrence and awareness techniques.

The MTA has recently engaged Kroll to undertake a comprehensive review of the current MTA security training program. This review will include an evaluation of industry best practices, a benchmarking of the MTA program against other domestic and international transit organizations, and recommendations for changes, where necessary.

**Public Awareness Program**

The MTA initiated its first generation of public awareness advertisements in March 2003. The ads, which featured the slogan “If You See Something, Say Something,” were developed at the MTA through its advertising agency, Korey Kay & Partners.

A second generation of ads were designed to help make riders more aware that they could help improve security by acting as additional “eyes and ears” for the system. In 2004, a third generation of ads featured a bomb-removal robot about to lift a suspicious package with one of two headlines: “Please Take Your Things. Or We Will” or “Did Anybody Find a Black Briefcase?” This ad was designed to illustrate the consequences of leaving a package unattended.

In the wake of the London train and bus bombings, the MTA initiated a new generation of security-related ads that thanked MTA customers for their vigilance and willingness to report suspicious items and/or individuals to the police and MTA employees. Headlined “Good Call,” the ads began appearing on subways, rail cars, and buses throughout the region, as well as in major and local newspapers, in late July 2005.

The MTA has also produced a series of videos and brochures that inform passengers of the MTA’s “If You See Something, Say Something” campaign and that instruct passengers on proper emergency evacuation procedures.

The MTA has teamed with the New York City Partnership to distribute educational materials to a number of large employers. According to the MTA, the New York City Partnership reports that 22 employers representing more than 104,000 employees had received educational materials as of December 2005, and that another 5,000 to 10,000 copies of the MTA’s evacuation brochure have been distributed since then. Despite these efforts, ensuring that riders are aware of emergency procedures remains a challenge.

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